In Matter Nautilus Motor Tanker by unknown
1996 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-20-1996 
In Matter Nautilus Motor Tanker 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996 
Recommended Citation 
"In Matter Nautilus Motor Tanker" (1996). 1996 Decisions. 180. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996/180 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1996 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                      FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
                                         
 
                           No. 95-5126 
                                         
 
                IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT OF 
         NAUTILUS MOTOR TANKER CO., LTD. AS OWNER OF THE 
              M/T BT NAUTILUS FOR EXONERATION FROM  
                   OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY, 
 
     Nautilus Motor Tanker Co., Ltd, Appellant 
 
                                  
 
           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
                  FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
                    (D.C. Civil No. 90-cv-02419) 
                                         
 
                    Argued:  October 10, 1995 
     Before:  STAPLETON, McKEE and NORRIS, Circuit Judges        
 
                       (Filed May 20, l996) 
 
                                         
 
 
                              JOHN J. REILLY (ARGUED) 
                              Haight, Gardner, Poor & Havens 
                              195 Broadway 
                              New York, NY 10007 
 
                              Counsel for Limitation Plaintiff-    
                              Appellant Nautilus Motor Tanker Co. 
                              Ltd. 
 
 
                              RICHARD H. WEBBER (ARGUED) 
                              Hill Rivkins Loesberg 
                                O'Brien Mulroy & Hayden 
                              90 West St. 
                              New York, NY 10006 
 
                              Counsel for Limitation Defendant-    
                              Appellee Coastal Oil New York, Inc. 
                               
 
 
                                         
                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                         
 McKEE, Circuit Judge 
     This dispute arises from the grounding of the tanker BT 
Nautilus, an 811 foot oil tanker owned by appellant Nautilus 
Motor Tanker Co., Ltd. ("Nautilus").  That grounding caused 
approximately 230,000 gallons of fuel oil to spill into the Kill 
van Kull waterway in Bayonne, New Jersey.  Thereafter, Nautilus 
commenced a proceeding in the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey under the Limitation of Liability Act, 
46 U.S.C.  181-189, in an effort to escape liability from 
various potential claimants including Coastal Oil New York, Inc. 
("Coastal"), the owner of the terminal. Coastal filed a 
counterclaim against Nautilus alleging that Nautilus was solely 
responsible for the grounding. Following a nonjury trial, the 
district court entered judgment for Coastal and against Nautilus 
on Coastal's counterclaim. 
     In this appeal from that judgment, we are asked to determine 
whether the district court erred in admitting opinions and 
conclusions contained in a Coast Guard Report of the incident 
into evidence.  We must also decide the relevance and possible 
application of a rather ancient rule of maritime law - the 
Pennsylvania Rule - to this controversy; and finally, we must 
decide whether the district court erred in concluding that 
Coastal's failure to provide navigational aids and information 
about the limits of its ship berth did not contribute to the 
accident.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the ruling 
of the district court.  
 
                               I.   
     We need only briefly set forth the underlying facts as they 
are detailed in the district court's opinion, In the Matter of 
the Complaint of Nautilus Motor Tanker Co., Ltd., 862 F.Supp. 
1260 (D.N.J. 1994), and largely uncontested.  On the morning of 
June 7, 1990, Moran Towing & Transportation, Co., Inc. ("Moran") 
dispatched two tugs and a docking pilot, Captain James Naughton, 
to assist BT Nautilus Captain Albert Frank Ainscough in docking 
his vessel at Coastal's terminal in Bayonne, New Jersey.  As the 
Nautilus neared the terminal, it ran aground.   
     On June 18, 1990, Nautilus filed a petition in the district 
court seeking exoneration and/or limitation of its liability 
under the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C.  181-189.  
Coastal responded by filing a claim against Nautilus, and 
Nautilus responded by seeking damages for Coastal's alleged 
negligence in causing the grounding.  
     At the ensuing bench trial on Coastal's counterclaim, 
Nautilus argued that Coastal "had breached its duty as a 
wharfinger because the vessel either grounded in the ship berth 
or, if it grounded outside the ship berth, the approach to the 
berth was unsafe."  Appellant's Brief at 5.  Coastal countered by 
arguing that the grounding was a direct consequence of negligent 
navigation by the vessel's captain and the docking pilot.   
     On September 27, 1994, the district court issued its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The court found that 
the BT Nautilus ran aground "at least 125 feet east of the 
Coastal New York ship berth," Nautilus, 862 F.Supp. at 1268, and 
that Nautilus had failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that any of Coastal's alleged negligent acts were a 
proximate cause of the grounding.  Accordingly, the district 
court entered judgment in Coastal's favor, and this appeal 
followed. 
     Nautilus challenges that judgment on three grounds.  First, 
Nautilus contends that the district court erred in admitting 
opinions and conclusions contained in a Coast Guard Report of 
this incident.  Second, Nautilus argues that the Pennsylvania 
Rule created a burden-shifting presumption that Coastal's 
statutory violations caused the grounding.  Finally, Nautilus 
argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that 
Coastal's failure to provide navigational aids and information on 
the limits of its ship berth did not contribute to the grounding.  
     We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1292(a)(3), 
which authorizes an appeal from an interlocutory order 
determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to 
admiralty cases.     
 
                               II. 
         A. The Admissibility of the Coast Guard Report. 
     Coast Guard regulations require Coast Guard personnel to 
conduct an investigation, and prepare a report following marine 
casualties and accidents. See 46 C.F.R.  4.07 (1994).  
Accordingly, the United States Coast Guard investigated the June 
7, 1990, grounding of the Nautilus and issued a public report 
that stated in part:  
     The apparent cause of this grounding was failure on 
     the part of the Docking Pilot to maintain the BT 
     NAUTILUS within the navigable limits of the channel 
     . . .[t]he docking pilot was not familiar with the 
     shape or dimensions of the dredged underwater basin 
     leading from the channel to the Terminal. 
 
     Except as noted above there is no evidence of. . . 
     misconduct, inattention to duty, negligence, or 
     willful violation of law or regulation. . .nor 
     evidence that any personnel of the Coast Guard, or 
     of any other federal agency, or any other person 
     contributed to this casualty. . . 
 
Coast Guard Report ("Report")  2, 18.  At trial, Coastal 
offered the entire Report into evidence under the exception to 
the hearsay rule for public records, FRE 803(8)(C).  The court 
received the report over the objection of Nautilus. That 
objection was based upon a provision in the Coast Guard 
regulations that states:  
     investigations of marine casualties. . .are for 
     the purpose of taking appropriate measures for 
     promoting safety of life and property at sea, and  
     are not intended to fix civil or criminal  
     responsibility. 
 
46 C.F.R.  4.07-1(b).  Nautilus argued that the foregoing 
portions of the Report held "no evidentiary relevance other than 
to fix liability. . ." , Appellant's Brief at 14, and should 
therefore be excluded under  4.07-1(b).  
     The district court concluded that the entire Report fit 
within the confines of FRE 803(8)(C) and deemed it admissible 
irrespective of 46 C.F.R.  4.07-1(b).   
     On appeal, Nautilus relies principally upon Huber v. United 
States, 838 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1988), and its progeny to argue 
that the district court erred in admitting the Report into 
evidence.  In Huber, two crew members drowned when their yacht 
sank north of San Francisco Bay. The surviving crew member joined 
decedents' representatives in a suit against the Coast Guard for 
failure to assist the vessel.  At trial, plaintiffs sought to 
admit two Coast Guard Reports prepared in the aftermath of the 
accident. The government objected and argued that the conclusions 
and recommendations in the Reports were barred by 46 C.F.R.  
4.07-1(b).  The court overruled the government's objection, and 
allowed the Reports into evidence as admissions of a party 
opponent under FRE 801(d)(2). 
     On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reversed.  The court held that, under section 4.07-1(b), "the 
Coast Guard investigating officers' conclusions and 
recommendations. . .[are] inadmissible as evidence in civil 
proceedings arising out of accidents covered by the investigation 
reports."  Huber, 838 F.2d at 402.  In reaching this result, the 
court first emphasized the necessity of such a rule under the 
circumstances of the suit before it: 
     A Coast Guard investigator might feel less free 
     to suggest appropriate measures 'for promoting 
     safety of life and property at sea' if he thought 
     that any suggestion of additional precautions  
     might result in imposing pecuniary liability  
     on the government. 
 
Id. at 402-403 (citing Reliable Transfer Co. v. United States, 53 
F.R.D. 24, 25 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) ).  The court also noted a 
perceived similarity between 46 C.F.R.  4.07-1(b) and federal 
enactments such as 49 U.S.C.  1903(c) -- which bars the 
admission into evidence of accident reports prepared by the 
National Transportation Safety Board.  The court noted that the 
only difference between the latter statute, and the former 
regulation is that  
     in one the Coast Guard acted pursuant to authority 
     from Congress. . .and in the other, Congress acted 
     directly. . . Either way, the result is the same: 
     all or portions of the reports are excluded from 
     evidence on authority of Congress. 
 
Id. at 403.  Other courts have relied on the reasoning of Huberto bar the 
admission of opinions and conclusions in Coast Guard 
Reports.  See  In the Matter of the Petition of Cleveland 
Tankers, Inc., 67 F.3d 1200, 1208 (6th Cir. 1995) (Barring 
opinions and conclusions in a Coast Guard Report); Yap v. 
Controlled Parasailing of Honolulu, Inc., 873 P.2d 1321, 1328 
(Haw. 1994) (Same). 
     Nautilus argues that since the Coast Guard acted pursuant to 
congressional authority, 46 C.F.R.  4.07-1(b) must preclude the 
admissibility of paragraphs two and eighteen of the Coast Guard 
Report.  Appellant's Reply Brief at 2.  We do not agree.  
     First, the government is not a party to this litigation.  
Thus, unlike in Huber, the Coast Guard has no interest in the 
outcome, and the policy justification for the regulation's 
evidentiary bar -- ensuring frank disclosure by Coast Guard 
investigators -- is completely removed.  The investigators here 
have no bias that may interfere with a full, fair, or accurate 
report of their findings or affect the course of their 
investigation.   
     Second, and more fundamentally, we affirm the ruling of the 
district court because it is axiomatic that federal regulations 
can not "trump" or repeal Acts of Congress.  See e.g., McComb v. 
Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 481 (3d Cir. 1991) ("No regulation can 
override legislative intent. . .").  46 C.F.R.  4.01-1(b) is not 
an Act of Congress; it is a federal regulation.   In contrast, 
the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted by Congress and must 
be regarded by this Court as any other federal statute.  Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 
2786, 2793, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993); see also, 21 C. Wright & K. 
Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure:  Evidence  5013 at 120 (1977) 
("Since the Rules of Evidence were enacted by Congress, no 
question of delegated power is involved.").   
     Although initially proposed by the Supreme Court, the 
Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted into law by Congress, Act 
of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub.L. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975), and they 
"govern proceedings in the courts of United States."  FRE 101; 
see also Salas by Salas v. Wang, 846 F.2d 897, 904 (3d Cir. 
1988).  Although promulgated pursuant to congressional 
authority, 46 C.F.R.  4.07-1(b) remains a regulation.  The 
delegation of congressional power that authorized its 
promulgation did not transform the regulation into an Act of 
Congress, nor allow it to prevail over contrary provisions of 
duly enacted statutes.  Accordingly, the Coast Guard may not, 
through its regulations, limit the authority of Congress to 
prescribe and enforce rules for the admissibility of evidence in 
the federal courts.  See e.g, Romero v. U.S., 153 F.R.D. 649, 652 
(D.Colo. 1994) (The Federal Rules of Evidence override an Army 
regulation, 32 C.F.R.  515.42, purporting to limit an Army 
doctor's expert testimony.).       
     FRE 402 provides the baseline for determining the 
admissibility of evidence in the federal courts.  See e.g., 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at __, 113 S.Ct. at 2793.  That rule provides 
that: 
     All relevant evidence is admissible, except as 
     otherwise provided by the Constitution of the 
     United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, 
     or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court 
     pursuant to statutory authority. . . 
 
FRE 402. FRE 401 defines "relevant" evidence as evidence "having 
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence."  Thus, the 
contents of the Coast Guard Report were directly relevant to the 
issues before the district court, and therefore admissible under 
FRE 402 unless barred by the Constitution, an Act of Congress, a 
Federal Rule of Evidence or a rule prescribed by the Supreme 
Court pursuant to statutory authority.  Clearly, no Coast Guard 
regulation can claim such a status.  The position urged upon us 
by Nautilus would cause us to judicially amend this enactment by 
replacing the phrase "by Act of Congress" with language similar 
to: "by Act of, or pursuant to the authority of, Congress."  
Since the Report was prepared by a government agency, its 
admissibility was appropriately considered under Rule 803(8), the 
public record exception.  See e.g., United States v. Versaint, 
849 F.2d 827, 831 (3d Cir. 1988).  Accordingly, we decline the 
invitation to follow the lead of Huber, and its progeny.   
     In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 109 S.Ct. 
439, 102 L.Ed. 445 (1988), the Supreme Court considered whether 
the public records exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 803(8)(C), 
extended to conclusions and opinions in public reports.  There, 
the court considered the admission into evidence of a Judge 
Advocate General Report on a United States Navy plane crash 
during a jury trial.  The Court concluded that Rule 803(8)(C) did 
not preclude the introduction of opinions and conclusions in such 
reports so long as two criteria were met.  First, all statements 
in such a report must be based on factual investigation.  Id. at 
167, 109 S.Ct. at 449.  Second, any portion of the report that is 
admitted must be sufficiently trustworthy.  Id. at 167, 109 S.Ct. 
at 449.  The Supreme Court cited with approval four non- 
exhaustive factors to be used in determining whether a report is 
sufficiently trustworthy:      
 
     (1) the timeliness of the investigation; (2) the 
     investigator's skill and experience; (3) whether 
     a hearing was held; and (4) possible bias when  
     reports are prepared with a view to possible 
     litigation.   
 
Id. at 168 n.11; 109 S.Ct. at 449.  Here, the district court 
properly applied these criteria, concluded that they were 
satisfied and admitted paragraphs two and eighteen of the Coast 
Guard Report under Rule 803(8)(C).  We do not think that the 
court erred in that analysis.  Moreover, we note that public 
reports are presumed admissible in the first instance and the 
party opposing their introduction bears the burden of coming 
forward with enough "negative factors" to persuade a court that a 
report should not be admitted. Beech Aircraft, 488 U.S. at 167 
109 S.Ct. at 448.  Courts have routinely admitted conclusions and 
recommendations in Coast Guard Reports under Beech Aircraft, 
irrespective of 46 C.F.R.  4.07-1(b).  See Puerto Rico Ports 
Authority v. M/V Manhattan Prince, 897 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) 
(Affirming the district court's admission of three conclusions in 
a Coast Guard Report); Fox v. United States and Robert Anderson, 
Civil No. C-94-0491, slip op. at 4-8 (N.D.Cal. February 14, 1996) 
(Coast Guard report admissible under Rule 803(8) so long as 
report meets trustworthiness standard of Beech Aircraft); Wright 
v. Daviesyndicate, Inc., 1993 WL 246020, *8,*9 n.10 (E.D.Pa. 
1993) (Conclusions contained in Coast Guard Report admitted 
without comment); Complaint of Kenneth I. Munyan, 143 F.R.D. 560, 
565-66 (D.N.J. 1992) (Conclusions and opinions in Coast Guard 
Report deemed admissible under Rule 803(8)(C)); Taylor v. 
Bouchard, 1991 WL 107279, *4 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (Opinions and 
conclusions in Coast Guard Report admitted).   
     Accordingly, we affirm the district court's evidentiary 
ruling that the challenged portions of the Report were admissible 
under Rule 803(8)(C). 
     
                    B. The Pennsylvania Rule. 
     The Pennsylvania Rule is named for the famous admiralty case 
in which it was first announced. The Rule provides that when:  
     a ship at the time of a collision is in actual 
     violation of a statutory rule intended to prevent 
     collisions, it is no more than a reasonable 
     presumption that the fault, if not the sole cause, 
     was at least a contributory cause of the disaster. 
     In such a case, the burden rests upon the ship of 
     showing not merely that her fault might not have 
     been one of the causes, or that it probably was 
     not, but that it could not have been.   
 
The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125, 136, 22 L.Ed. 148 
(1874).  While the presumption that arises under the Rule is 
rebuttable, Id. at 130, it is by its very language, a weighty 
one.  Although the Rule originally applied only to collisions 
between ships, it has been reformulated to apply to any statutory 
violator who is a party to a maritime accident.  See e.g., 
Pennzoil Producing Co. v. Offshore Express, Inc., 943 F.2d 1465, 
1471 (5th Cir. 1991).          
     In United States v. Nassau Marine, 778 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 
1985), the court articulated a test for determining when to apply 
the presumption of the Pennsylvania Rule.  That Court held that 
three elements must exist:  (1) proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence of violation of a statute or regulation that imposes a 
mandatory duty; (2) the statute or regulation must involve marine 
safety or navigation; and (3) the injury suffered must be of a 
nature that the statute or regulation was intended to prevent.  
Id. at 1116-1117; Folkstone Maritime v. CSX Corporation, 64 F.3d 
1037, 1047 (7th Cir. 1995).  If each of these criteria are 
satisfied, a party is entitled to a presumption that a statutory 
violation of a defendant caused, or at least contributed to, the 
injury or damage complained of.  However, a statutory violator 
may rebut the presumption of the Rule by making a clear and 
convincing showing that the violation could not have been a 
proximate cause of the collision, Cliffs-Neddrill v. M/T Rich 
Duke, 947 F.2d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 1991), or by demonstrating that 
the accident would have occurred despite the statutory violation.  
See e.g., Folkstone Maritime, 64 F.3d at 1047.  
     The Rule casts its shadow on this case because it is 
undisputed that in 1990, Coastal engaged in over-dredging in its 
barge berth beyond the scope of its U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
permit in violation of Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act 
of 1899, 33 U.S.C.  403.  The dredged material was displaced 
into Coastal's ship berth causing "high spots" or navigational 
obstructions in that area.   
     Nautilus theorizes that the forward part of the BT Nautilus 
entered Coastal's ship berth on the morning of June 7, 1990 and 
struck one of these high spots, Transcript of Oral Argument at 
23, thereby causing the vessel to rotate so that its midpoint 
struck bottom at a point outside of the ship berth.  Id. at 23.  
However, Nautilus argues that, even assuming the BT Nautilus ran 
aground outside Coastal's ship berth, a grounding within the 
limits of the Coastal Terminal should implicate the Pennsylvania 
Rule and require reversal of the burden of proof.  Appellant's 
Brief at 29. 
     The district court rejected Nautilus' theory of the 
grounding and refused to apply the Pennsylvania Rule.  The court 
concluded that the Rule did not apply since Nautilus had 
presented no evidence that any impact had occurred in or near 
Coastal's ship berth -- the location of the dredging violations. 
     If the BT Nautilus had hit "high spots" or some  
     obstruction in the ship berth, then Coastal would have 
     the burden of proving its statutory violation could not 
     have caused the "high spots" or the obstruction.  But  
     the BT Nautilus did not ground in the ship berth.  It 
     grounded in an area well to the east, outside the  
     federal channel and outside the ship berth.  Nautilus 
     has never contended this area was impacted by the 
     dredging in the Coastal barge berth. 
 
Nautilus, 862 F.Supp. at 1273.  The district court thus required 
some "nexus between the statutory violation and the accident", 
Id. at 1274, as a condition precedent to applying the Rule.  In 
doing so, the court relied upon the holding in Gosnell v. United 
States, 262 F.2d 559 (4th Cir. 1958).   
     In Gosnell, the United States Navy violated the Wreck 
Statute, 33 U.S.C.  409, by towing a barge at too great a speed 
-- causing it to sink in Delaware Bay.  Eight days later and 
nearly four miles from the site of the casualty, a fishing vessel 
sunk after striking an unseen object in the same bay.  The owner 
of the fishing vessel brought a claim against the United States, 
and the court of appeals affirmed the district court's refusal to 
apply the Pennsylvania Rule in the absence of any evidence of a 
nexus between the statutory violation and the accident.  Id. at 
564.  The court stated:  
     Any plaintiff. . .who seeks to hold a defendant 
     liable. . .must show:  (1) the physical cause of 
     the harm; (2) fault on the part of the person 
     sought to be held responsible; and (3) a causal 
     connection between such fault and the physical 
     cause. . . 
 Gosnell, 262 F.2d at 563 (quoting The YFNX-6, 156 F.Supp. 325, 
331 (D.Md. 1957) ).  Thus, in cases where there is no clear link 
between the statutory violation and the casualty, the party 
seeking to take advantage of the Rule has been required to make 
some showing that the statutory violation may have had some 
relation to the accident. 
     Indeed, a contrary rule, such as is urged upon us by 
appellants, would result in a presumption of liability following 
any statutory violation no matter how remote or inconsequential 
such a violation may have been to the subsequent accident.  
Neither precedent nor logic compels such a drastic result.  The 
Rule was clearly intended to aid those who had been injured as a 
result of the statutory violation of a defendant in admiralty.  
We do not believe it was intended to increase the likelihood of 
liability no matter how remote and unrelated an injury to a 
statutory violation.    
     The Pennsylvania Rule was not meant to be a hard 
     and fast rule that requires a finding of fault 
     for statutory violations no matter how speculative,           
     improbable, or remote. 
 
Cliffs-Neddrill, 947 F.2d at 88. 
     In another context we have stated "'[w]here stops the 
reason, there stops the rule.'" Aetna v. Barthelemy, 33 F.3d 189, 
193 (3rd Cir., 1994) (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn,  Jurisprudence:  
Realism in Theory and Practice 217 (1962)).   
     Here, the district court found that the point of impact of 
the BT Nautilus was at least 125 feet east of Coastal's ship 
berth where the illegal dredging operations had occurred.  That 
finding was not clearly erroneous.  See e.g., Haines v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 92 (3d Cir. 1992)  (Under the clearly 
erroneous standard, findings of fact made in actions tried by the 
court without a jury may be reversed only if such findings are 
"completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support displaying some 
hue of credibility, or. . .bear no rational relationship to the 
supportive evidentiary data.").  Here, expert commercial divers 
hired by both parties concluded that the vessel ran aground to 
the east of the Coastal ship berth and outside the federal 
channel.  The eyewitness testimony of a Coastal dockworker, 
Theodore Rovatsos, supported that conclusion.  No diver ever 
found any evidence of any kind to support Nautilus' theory of 
impact in the Coastal ship berth.  Moreover, Nautilus could not 
demonstrate that the forward 400 feet of the vessel were damaged 
in any way on the morning of June 7, 1990.  Common sense suggests 
that, had the BT Nautilus first struck ground in the ship berth 
as Nautilus suggests, the forward part of the vessel would 
sustain some damage, or reflect some trace of the grounding. Yet, 
there was no evidence of even minor scratching of the paint on 
the forward part of the BT Nautilus.   
     Since the effects of Coastal's statutory violation were 
limited to an area (i.e., the ship berth) nearly 125 feet from 
the only point of grounding impact, we refuse to require the 
mechanical application of the Pennsylvania Rule.  Moreover, even 
assuming the Rule applied here, we believe Coastal rebutted the 
presumption of causation with overwhelming evidence that its 
illegal dredging could not have been a proximate cause of the 
June 1990 grounding because the grounding occurred outside that 
berth.  See e.g., U.S. Fire Insurance Co. v. Allied Towing, 966 
F.2d 820, 825 (4th Cir. 1992) (Whether Pennsylvania Rule was 
applied is irrelevant since party proved at trial that his ship's 
failure to have its lights on could not have been cause of 
collision); Alter Barge Line v. TPC Transportation, 801 F.2d 
1026, 1029 (8th Cir. 1986) (Even assuming that the overtaken tug 
committed a statutory fault, failure to apply the Pennsylvania 
Rule is irrelevant since evidence clearly indicated that 
overtaking tug was sole cause of collision).       
          C. Coastal's Duty to Provide a Safe Approach. 
     Finally, Nautilus contends that Coastal breached its duty of 
reasonable diligence as a wharfinger.  In particular, appellant 
argues that Coastal "breached its duty to provide a safe approach 
by failing to install navigational aids and provide information 
about the limits of its Ship Berth."  Appellant's Brief at 33.   
However, the district court concluded that Coastal's alleged 
omissions were not a proximate cause of the June 7, 1990 
grounding.  Nautilus, 862 F.Supp. at 1276.  We review that 
finding under a "clearly erroneous" standard.  Fed.R.Civ.P. 
52(a).   
     Under admiralty law, it is well-settled that a wharfinger 
who invites a party to use its dock facilities is not the 
guarantor of the vessel's safety.  However, the wharfinger is 
"bound to exercise reasonable diligence in ascertaining the 
condition of the berths and if there is any dangerous 
obstruction, to remove it, or to give due notice of its existence 
to vessels about to use the berths."  Smith v. Burnett, 173 U.S. 
430, 433, 19 S.Ct. 442, 443, 43 L.Ed. 756 (1899).  A wharfinger 
also has a duty to maintain a safe approach.  Id. at 436, 19 
S.Ct. at 444; Trade Banner Line, Inc. v. Caribbean Steamship Co., 
521 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1975); Sonat Marine Inc. v. Belcher 
Oil Co., 629 F.Supp. 1319, 1327 (D.N.J. 1985), aff'd 787 F.2d 583 
(3d Cir. 1986).  However, there is no duty to ensure safe 
surroundings or warn of hazards merely in the vicinity.  Trade 
Banner Line, 521 F.2d at 230.  In short, a vessel should be able 
to enter, use and exit a wharfinger's dock facilities without 
being exposed to dangers that cannot be avoided by reasonably 
prudent navigation and seamanship.  
     We do not find the district court's determination as to 
causation to be clearly erroneous.  First, marine navigational 
charts on board the BT Nautilus (British Admiralty Chart No. 
2753), and known to its docking pilot clearly and accurately 
depicted the area in which the BT Nautilus ran aground as a 
shallow area.  Moreover, a moving vessel and her owner are 
subject to a presumption of negligence when the vessel strikes a 
well-charted, stationary object or obstruction.  The Oregon, 158 
U.S. 186, 197, 15 S.Ct. 804, 39 L.Ed. 943 (1895); City of Boston 
v. S.S. Texaco, 773 F.2d 1396, 1398 (1st Cir. 1985).     
     In addition, substantial evidence indicated that unofficial 
aids were sufficient for navigating a safe approach to the 
Coastal ship berth.  Although Nautilus' experts maintained that 
the absence of aids marking the boundary of the ship berth made 
the approach difficult, the district court explicitly credited 
the testimony of Coastal's expert, Captain Jay D. Bolton, and 
eyewitness, Theodore Rovatsos, as to the existence and adequacy 
of unofficial aids.  The district court's conclusions regarding 
such testimony, based on assessments of witness credibility, are 
deserving of the highest degree of appellate deference.  Anderson 
v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 575, 105 S.Ct. 
1504, 1513, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985).  Moreover, Coast Guard 
investigators, who would be expected to target such dangers, 
never mentioned any inadequacy of navigational aids here.  
Docking pilot Naughton even testified that a parallel dock (the 
IMTT Facility), similar in all relevant respects, was safe 
despite the absence of any aids to navigation beyond those 
existing at the Coastal Terminal.  Furthermore, we cannot fail to 
note that throughout the period of the grounding, similar tankers 
docked without incident or objection to the absence of official 
navigational aids or information on the limits on Coastal's ship 
berth.           
     Finally, it is undisputed that Captain Ainscough maintained 
a copy of The Guide to Tanker Ports on board the BT Nautilus at 
the time of the grounding.  Although that Guide and its 
procedures for docking at the Coastal Terminal were well-known to 
both Ainscough and Naughton, neither chose to follow its 
instructions on the morning of the grounding.  The BT Nautilus 
departed for the Coastal Terminal nearly three hours before the 
time recommended by the Guide.  The evidence before the district 
court suggests that, had Ainscough simply left at the suggested 
time, his vessel would have encountered minimal tidal currents 
and superior docking conditions.  Moreover, having arrived at a 
time of strong tidal currents, Naughton compounded the error when 
he failed to utilize the "breasting in" approach recommended by 
the Guide.   
     The district court's conclusion that this grounding was not 
caused by a breach of duty on the part of Coastal is, therefore, 
firmly supported by this record. 
 
                               IV. 
     For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 









IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT OF  
NAUTILUS MOTOR TANKER, No. 95-5126 
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, Concurring: 
  
         I join the opinion of the court.  I write separately 
only because I believe there is an additional, and equally 
persuasive, reason why  4.07-1 of the Coast Guard Regulations 
did not bar the admission of the investigation report in this 
case.  It seems apparent to me that the Secretary, in adopting 
this regulation, did not intend to prescribe a rule governing the 
admission of evidence in a court of law. 
         Section 6301 of Title 46 of the United States Code 
provides: 
          6301.  Investigation of marine casualties 
 
              The Secretary shall prescribe 
         regulations for the immediate investigation 
         of marine casualties under this part to 
         decide, as closely as possible -- 
 
              (1) the cause of the casualty, including 
         the cause of any death; 
 
              (2) whether an act of misconduct, 
         incompetence, negligence, unskillfulness, or 
         willful violation of law committed by any 
         individual licensed, certificated, or 
         documented under part E of this subtitle has 
         contributed to the cause of the casualty, or 
         to a death involved in the casualty, so that 
         appropriate remedial action under chapter 77 
         of this title [relating to license suspension 
         and revocation proceedings] may be taken; 
 
              (3) whether an act of misconduct, 
         incompetence, negligence, unskillfulness, or 
         willful violation of law committed by any 
         person, including an officer, employee, or 
         member of the Coast Guard, contributed to the 
         cause of the casualty, or to a death involved 
         in the casualty; 
 
              (4) whether there is evidence that an 
         act subjecting the offender to a civil 
         penalty under the laws of the United States 
         has been committed, so that appropriate 
         action may be undertaken to collect the 
         penalty; 
 
              (5) whether there is evidence that a 
         criminal act under the laws of the United 
         States has been committed, so that the matter 
         may be referred to appropriate authorities 
         for prosecution; and 
 
              (6) whether there is need for new laws 
         or regulations, or amendment or repeal of 
         existing laws or regulations, to prevent the 
         recurrence of the casualty. 
 
Section 6305 further provides that the Secretary shall prescribe 
regulations concerning the reports of such investigations and 
requires that those reports be "made available to the public, 
except to the extent that they contain information related to the 
national security."   
         Pursuant to these directives, the Secretary has 
promulgated 46 C.F.R.  4.07-1, the prefatory section to a 
Subpart relating to "Investigations."  It provides: 
          4.07-1  Commandant or District Commander to 
         order investigation. 
 
              (a)  The Commandant or District 
         Commander upon receipt of information of a 
         marine casualty or accident, will immediately 
         cause such investigation as may be necessary 
         in accordance with the regulations in this 
         part. 
 
              (b)  The investigations of marine 
         casualties and accidents and the 
         determinations made are for the purpose of 
         taking appropriate measures for promoting 
         safety of life and property at sea, and are 
         not intended to fix civil or criminal 
         responsibility. 
 
              (c)  The investigation will determine as 
         closely as possible: 
 
              (1)  The cause of the accident; 
 
              (2)  Whether there is evidence that 
              any failure of material (either 
              physical or design) was involved or 
              contributed to the casualty, so 
              that proper recommendations for the 
              prevention of the recurrence of 
              similar casualties may be made; 
 
              (3)  Whether there is evidence that 
              any act of misconduct, inattention 
              to duty, negligence or willful 
              violation of the law on the part of 
              any licensed or certificated man 
              contributed to the casualty, so 
              that appropriate proceedings 
              against the license or certificate 
              of such person may be recommended 
              and taken under title 46, U.S. 
              Code, section 239; 
               (4)  Whether there is evidence that 
              any Coast Guard personnel or any 
              representative or employee of any 
              other government agency or any 
              other person caused or contributed 
              to the cause of the casualty; or, 
 
              (5)  Whether the accident shall be 
              further investigated by a Marine 
              Board of Investigation in 
              accordance with regulations in 
              subpart 4.09.  
 
         The purpose of  4.07-1(b) and (c) is to explain, for 
the benefit of those conducting investigations and those reading 
and using investigation reports, the limited purposes for which 
Coast Guard investigations of casualties are conducted.  The last 
clause of  4.07-1(b) explains that they are "not intended to fix 
civil or criminal responsibility."  This means, among other 
things, that the ultimate determination of licensing issues is 
left to suspension or revocation proceedings, civil penalty 
issues to civil penalty proceedings, and criminal culpability 
issues to criminal proceedings.  If there was any intent with 
respect to other civil liability issues, I am confident that the 
intent was to advise that the ultimate determination of issues of 
civil liability is reserved for civil judicial proceedings and 
that the information contained in a Coast Guard investigation 
report should be evaluated and utilized with the understanding 
that the focus of the investigation was not on assigning the 
responsibilities of the participants inter se. 
         I am also confident that, if the Secretary had meant     
 4.07-1(b) to govern the admission of evidence in court, he 
would have chosen a far less tortuous way of saying so.  The 
models available to him, as he is likely to have been aware, are 
numerous.  See 42 U.S.C.  2240 ("No report by any licensee [of 
the NRC] of any incident arising out of or in connection with a 
licensed activity made pursuant to any requirement of the 
Commission shall be admitted as evidence in any suit or action 
for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in such 
report."); 49 U.S.C.  1441(e) (repealed Pub. L. No. 103-272,  
7(b), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 1379) ("No part of any report or 
reports of the National Transportation Safety Board relating to 
any accident or the investigation thereof, shall be admitted as 
evidence or used in any suit or action for damages growing out of 
any matter mentioned in such report or reports."); 45 U.S.C.  33 
(repealed Pub. L. No. 103-272,  7(b), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 
1379) ("[Neither reports of Railroad accidents by the director of 
locomotive inspection nor reports of his investigation] shall be 
admitted as evidence or used for any purpose in any suit or 
action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said 
report or investigation."); see also H.R. 1361, 104th Cong., 1st 
Sess.  414 (1995) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
any opinion, recommendation, deliberation, or conclusion 
contained in a report of a marine casualty investigation 
conducted under section 6301 of this title with respect to the 
cause of, or factors contributing to, the casualty set forth in 
the report of the investigation is not admissible as evidence or 
subject to discovery in any civil, administrative, or State 
criminal proceeding arising from a marine casualty, other than 
with the permission and consent of the Secretary of 











NORRIS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part, 
and dissenting from the judgment: 
 
         I join the majority opinion except in its holding that 
conclusions in a Coast Guard report of a marine casualty 
investigation are admissible as evidence in civil cases.  In so 
holding, the majority creates a square conflict with the Sixth 
and Ninth Circuits, the only other circuits that have addressed 
and decided this question. 
 
              In In re Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 67 F.3d 1200, 
1208 (6th Cir. 1995), the Sixth Circuit held that under the Coast 
Guard regulation at issue, 46 C.F.R.  4.07-1(b), conclusions 
in Coast Guard reports are not admissible.  The Sixth Circuit 
reasoned that  
         the function of the Coast Guard 
         reports is altogether different 
         from that of fixing liability.  The 
         Coast Guard report is, to a great 
         extent, forward-looking, since it 
         is meant in part to aid in 
         developing rules to make shipping 
         safer.  In a lawsuit, a court must 
         look backward to facts and rules as 
         known to the actors at the time of 
         the accident.  Introducing the 
         Coast Guard's conclusions may 
         confuse the two sorts of inquiries. 
 
Id. (citation omitted).   
 
    In Cleveland Tankers, the Sixth Circuit followed the 
Ninth Circuit's decision in Huber v. United States, 838 F.2d 398, 
403 (9th Cir. 1988).  The majority attempts to distinguish Huberon the 
ground that the Coast Guard was a party to that action.   
However, the Sixth Circuit expressly rejected that distinction 
and held that "Huber's reasoning is sound" even in cases in which 
the Coast Guard has no interest.  Cleveland Tankers, 67 F.3d at 
1208. 
 
         In creating a conflict with the Sixth and Ninth 
Circuits, the majority relies on Puerto Rico Ports Auth. v. M/V 
Manhattan Prince, 897 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).  That reliance 
is misplaced.  In Manhattan Prince, the First Circuit neither 
addressed nor decided the question whether 46 C.F.R.  4.07-1(b) 
bars the admission of conclusions in Coast Guard reports as 
evidence.  The First Circuit made no reference to 46 C.F.R.  
4.07-1(b), apparently because it was not cited by either party.   
See id. ("Both sides agree that Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 
488 U.S. 153 (1988) controls the admissibility of the report.").  
Rather, the First Circuit analyzed the admissibility of 
conclusions in a Coast Guard report solely under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 803. 
 
         Other than Manhattan Prince, the only cases cited 
by the majority are four district court decisions, three of which 
are unpublished and only one of which addresses the question 
whether 46 C.F.R.  4.07-1(b) bars the admission of conclusions 
in Coast Guard reports as evidence.  In Complaint of Kenneth I. 
Munyan, 143 F.R.D. 560, 565-66 (D.N.J. 1992), the only published 
decision cited by the majority, the court made no reference to 46 
C.F.R.  4.07-1(b), and analyzed the admissibility of a Coast 
Guard report solely under Federal Rule of Evidence 803.     
 
               The only district court decision cited by the 
majority that addresses the question whether 46 C.F.R.  
4.07-1(b) bars the admission of conclusions in a Coast Guard 
report is an unpublished order on a motion in limine in Fox v. 
United States, No. C-94-0941, slip op. at 4-8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 
1996).  There, the district court declined to apply Huber and 
decided that 46 C.F.R.  4.07-1(b) did not bar the admission of 
Coast Guard conclusions under Beech Aircraft v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 
153 (1988).  Like the majority here, the district court decided 
that an agency regulation "cannot trump congressionally enacted 
rules of evidence."  Fox, slip op. at 7.  With all due respect, I 
believe that a specific agency regulation can create an exception 
to a general rule of evidence, as long as the agency acts within 
the scope of the rulemaking authority granted to it by Congress.  
In promulgating 46 C.F.R.  4.07-1(b), the Coast Guard was 
clearly acting within the scope of its authority.           As the Ninth 
                  Circuit put it,  
                               [t]he only difference between the 
                               Coast Guard regulation banning the 
                               use of accident reports as evidence 
                               and a statute such as 49 U.S.C.  
                               1441(e) banning the use of aviation 
                               accident reports as evidence is 
                               that in one the Coast Guard acted 
                               pursuant to authority from Congress 
                               to pursue safety on the high seas, 
                               and in the other, Congress acted 
                               directly in promoting air safety.  
                               Either way, the result is the same:  
                               all or portions of the reports are 
                               excluded from evidence on authority 
                               of Congress. 
                   
                  Huber, 838 F.2d at 403. 
                   
                               I respectfully dissent. 
